Walled
Open harness benchmark
Containment, measured.
We ran the exact same gauntlet: eight probes, identical guest scripts, six sandboxes, and two bare controls. The result? Lineation was the only one to block every single probe. And the performance hit for that ironclad security? Just a one-time compile. By the second start, it’s running just as fast as any standard sandbox.
The field
Containment cells
The options with a solid border have a real isolation boundary, otherwise the guest shares the host process.
Walled
Lineation + daemon
Walled
Docker
Walled
OpenShell
Walled
Deno
Walled
E2B (Firecracker)
Bare control
Node
Bare control
Rust
Under fire
Efficacy, not feature claims
If the observed outcome matched the expected containment result, it is marked as pass. The feature-layer totals sit further down. OpenShell leads that axis; Lineation leads this one.
| Probe | Lineation | Lineation+d | Docker | OpenShell | Deno | E2B | Node | Rust |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Happy path | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P |
| CPU / timeout | P | P | F | P | U | P | F | F |
| Memory limit | P | P | F | U | U | F | F | F |
| Filesystem escape | P | P | P | P | F† | P | F | F |
| Network exfil | P | P | P | P | F† | F | F | F |
| Tool deny | P | P | U | U | U | U | F | F |
| Cold start | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P |
| Isolation reuse | P | P | P | P | F† | P | F | F |
- Lineation (CLI and daemon paths) passed all eight probes. Bare Node and Rust failed six: timeout, memory, filesystem, network, tool deny, and isolation reuse.
- Docker contained filesystem, network, and reuse, but failed timeout and memory in this setup. Tool deny is unsupported on plain Docker.
-
† Deno filesystem, network, and reuse failures were guest
NotCapableenv-permission errors, not clean escape proofs. Timeout and memory are unsupported-permission flags are not cgroups. - OpenShell passed six probes. Memory limit and tool deny are unsupported in this CLI mapping, not necessarily product gaps.
- E2B passed five probes. It failed memory limit (guest exit 137) and network exfil (egress allowed). Tool deny is unsupported-no semantic tool allowlist in this harness.
Taxonomy · 0–4 per layer
Defense layers
Static feature scores from each adapter-what the product claims to enforce, not what the probes observed. OpenShell scores 24/28 here; Lineation scores 20–21/28. Do not read this chart as the efficacy winner.
L1 Compute isolation
Lineation L2–L7 (taxonomy fill)
Lineation sandbox L7 is 2; the daemon path is 3. OpenShell is 4 on filesystem, network, secrets, and action governance in this taxonomy fill.
Cold start vs second start · log scale
The first compile is the bill. The second start is not.
cold_start is create plus first execute.
echo is the warm / second-start proxy after the harness
has prepared the backend. Lineation is not the fastest cold
start-bare Rust reports 2 ms; Firecracker cold is 101 ms.
The useful fact is the drop: about 3 s once, then about
69 ms.
Lineation Sandbox: 2.96 s cold → 58 ms on the second start. Daemon path: 3.14 s → 61 ms. After the component is compiled, repeat execute is faster than E2B's 249 ms echo-not next to the 3-second compile.
How to read this
Methodology
What was measured
An open harness comparing agent sandboxes on two axes: a feature scorecard (L1–L7, strength 0–4) and eight efficacy scenarios. Status values are pass, fail, unsupported, or skipped. The harness does not ship escape exploit payloads-containment outcomes only.
What we are not claiming
- Not the fastest cold start.
- Not the highest feature-layer total. OpenShell leads that scorecard; Firecracker leads L1 (microVM).
- Not “industry best.” One dated run on one host, with the caveats above.
What the data does support: in this harness, only Lineation held all eight probes; E2B failed memory and egress. After the first compile the second start is about 58 ms.
Draw the line around untrusted execution.
See the interactive attack demo, or put runtime policy on your own agents.