The platform

One platform to see, control, and defend every AI agent.

Lineation is the LLM gateway and MCP gateway between your providers, tools, and internal systems—backed by zero-trust agent identity. Every agent gets a scoped non-human identity; every model call and tool call is policy-checked at the moment of action; every decision leaves an audit trail you can replay.

Three layers, adopt in order

Observability → Governance → Defense

Start by seeing what your agents do. Add controls. Then turn on active defense. Each layer stands alone and compounds with the next.

Layer 01 · Observability

See what your agents are doing

Real-time dashboards & decision logs

  • Agent registry that auto-discovers shadow AI built in Zapier, Lindy, or scripts
  • Cross-provider activity feed normalized into one schema
  • Decision logs: why an agent acted, not just that it did
  • Replay mode — a black-box recorder for any flagged event
Layer 02 · Governance

Control what your agents can do

Policy-as-code, RBAC, identity & gateways

  • Zero-trust agent identity (NHI)—continuous authz, least privilege, no shared keys
  • LLM gateway: normalize, evaluate policy, then forward across every provider
  • MCP gateway: mediate tool and server calls under the same identity and policy
  • Policy-as-code evaluated at runtime, before actions execute
  • Approval gates for high-risk operations with override workflow
Layer 03 · Defense

Stop your agents from being hacked

Runtime protection & containment

  • Prompt-injection scrubbing on incoming data before the agent sees it
  • PII & secret redaction at output time
  • Trigger an immediate kill-switch on access
  • Sandboxed execution for untrusted tool calls

Identity and gateways

The accountability layer for models and tools

Zero-trust identity answers who is acting. The LLM gateway and MCP gateway answer what they may reach—and leave a record when they try.

Identity

Zero-trust agent identity

Every agent receives a verifiable non-human identity tied to owner, scope, and authorized capabilities. Access is never assumed from a shared service account—it is continuously evaluated against policy. When a CISO asks who executed an action, the answer is a specific agent under a specific policy—not "the API key."

LLM gateway

LLM gateway

Sit between your agents and OpenAI, Claude, Gemini, Copilot, and the next provider you adopt. Requests are normalized into one schema, scored against runtime policy, then forwarded—or blocked—before a token reaches the model. Provider drift stays in the connector layer; your policies do not move.

MCP gateway

MCP gateway

MCP servers and tools inherit the same identity, policy, and audit path as model traffic. Tool calls are mediated like LLM calls: least privilege by default, allow/block/sanitize at decision time, and full lineage from prompt to tool to data to actor when something goes wrong.

Architecture principle

Centralized governance, distributed enforcement

You define policy once, in a unified control plane, and enforce it everywhere—across every LLM provider and MCP server your agents use, at the endpoint where they execute, and in real time as actions are proposed.

Providers and endpoint daemons feed the control plane—LLM gateway, MCP gateway, and zero-trust identity—which brokers access to enterprise data. PROVIDER LAYER OpenAI connector Claude connector Gemini connector Copilot connector ENDPOINT LAYER Daemon · cache · egress Control Plane LLM gateway MCP gateway Zero-trust identity Policy engine Immutable audit store DATA + SIEM/SOAR SQL / Drive / Slack Payments / APIs SIEM / SOAR Compliance reports
LLM and MCP traffic is brokered under zero-trust agent identity; provider drift stays in the connector layer—your policies do not move.

Reference control flow

What happens in the seven steps of a single action

Every agent action follows the same path. Sub-second on the happy path; instant containment when a threshold is crossed.

Seven-step control flow from action request to alert. 1 · Action request agent proposes 2 · Daemon pre-check local cache 3 · Policy decision control plane 4 · Allow / block / sanitize 5 · Log trace immutable 6 · Risk score update baseline 7 · Alert / case if threshold
ADR-003: default-deny on high-risk actions, with an override workflow for authorized humans.

Capabilities

Nine capabilities that close the loop

Zero-trust agent identity

Per-agent non-human identity with continuous authorization and least privilege—every action attributable to a scoped, owned agent.

LLM gateway

Secure path between agents and every model provider: normalize, evaluate policy, then forward—or block—before tokens leave your boundary.

MCP gateway

Mediate MCP tool and server traffic under the same identity, policy, and audit trail as LLM calls.

Unified policy plane

One language for what agents may do, where, and with whose data—normalized across OpenAI, Claude, Google Cloud, AWS, and Azure.

Endpoint enforcement

A local daemon enforces rules with a cached policy set, even under latency—where agents actually run.

Activity lineage

Forensic-grade chains: prompt → tool → data → policy → output → actor. Query, export, replay.

Risk + detection

Agent-behavior-aware scoring, calibrated to each agent's baseline—target false-positive rate under 15%.

Incident workflow

Case management, containment options, and first-class SIEM/SOAR output. Extend the response stack you already run.

Trust reports

Customer- and auditor-shareable reports generated from the audit log in minutes—not a cross-functional scramble.

Architecture decisions

The trade-offs, stated plainly

ADR-001 · Centralized policy + distributed enforcement

Easier governance and consistency across providers, at the cost of stricter high-availability requirements on the control plane. We mitigate with a local policy cache so enforcement survives a control-plane blip.

ADR-002 · Provider abstraction vs. direct coupling

More upfront complexity in the connector layer, much lower long-term provider lock-in. When a provider changes its API, the adapter absorbs it—your policies don't move.

ADR-003 · Default-deny for high-risk actions

Stronger security posture with some initial user friction. High-risk operations require an explicit allow or an authorized override, which is itself logged.

Deploy in days, not quarters.

Connectors for your active providers, daemon install, and policy bootstrap from templates. Your first defensible policy is live before your next security review.